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First Amendment—Defamation—Editorial Privilege: Herbert v. Lando' —In
March, 1971, Colonel Anthony Herbert, a highly decorated career soldier,
formally charged his superior officers with covering up reports of war at-
rocities in Viet. Nam.' Herbert's story fascinated the American public which
had become increasingly disillusioned with the war in Viet. Nam. His accusa-
tions received widespread media attention.' In 1973, Herbert again became
the center of controversy after CBS broadcast a segment of the news
documentary program "Sixty Minutes" entitled "The Selling of Colonel Her-
bert." The segment, produced by Barry Lando and narrated by Mike Wallace,
cast serious doubts upon Herbert's veracity and concluded that the press had
been deluded by Herbert's story. 4
 Herbert responded to the broadcast by
bringing a defamation action against Lando, Wallace, and CBS claiming
nearly $45,000,000 in damages to his reputation and to the literary value of
his book about, his experiences." After filing suit, Herbert initiated extensive
discovery and Lando answered numerous questions about facts he had
learned, who he had interviewed, and the content of the interviews. Lando
balked, however, when asked questions relating to his beliefs, intent and con-
clusions in preparing the program!' Herbert then filed a motion to compel
Lando to respond to his questions.'
' 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
2 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1977). Herbert. claimed
that he witnessed numerous war atrocities while commanding a combat battalion. He
further alleged that he reported these atrocities to his commanding officers Colonel
Franklin and General Barnes. According to Herbert. neither was interested in inves-
tigating and when Herbert insisted on pursuing the issue he was removed from his
command. Id. at 980.
3 Id. For example, Herbert was the subject of favorable articles in Life
magazine and the New York Times and was interviewed on a national talk show by Dick
Cavett. Id.
Id. at 981-82. Lando raped interviews with several Army officers, including
Barnes and Franklin, who denied Herbert's claims. In addition, the segment pin-
pointed several inconsistencies in Herbert's story—the most damaging of which in-
volved the events of February 14, 1969. Herbert claimed that on that day he witnessed
the brutual murder of four prisoners of war by South Vietnamese soldiers while an
American advisor callously looked on. Herbert stated that he immediately reported the
event to his superior Colonel Franklin. Franklin denied receiving such a report and
claimed that he was returning from Hawaii on that date. Lando produced evidence,
including a hotel receipt, confirming that Franklin had been in Hawaii on February
14, 1969. The general impression conveyed by the broadcast was that Herbert had
concocted the stories of reporting war crimes as an excuse for his relief from com-
mand. hi.
Id. at 982. See A. HERBERT &- J. WOOTEN, SOLDIER (1973).
" 568 F.2d at 982-83. The court of appeals grouped the questions which were
objected to into five categories:
(1) Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or
leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Minutes'' seg-
ment; (2) Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of
mind with respect. to the veracity of persons interviewed; (3) the basis for conclusions
where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of per-
sons, information or events; (4) conversations between Lando and Wallace about mat-
ter to be included or excluded from the broadcast; and (5) Lando's intentions as man-
ifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material. Id. at 983.
Id. FED. R. CAN/. P. 37(a)(2).
1225
1224	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21;1223
The district court granted Herbert's motion. 8 In reaching its decision to
compel discovery, the district court reasoned that Herbert should be afforded
the benefit of a liberal interpretation of the rules of discovery in view of the
heavy burden of proof imposed by the New York Times v. Sullivan" standard.'"
A divided, three-judge court of appeals reversed," holding that. the editorial
process is protected by the first amendment and is privileged from discovery
in a defamation action brought by a public figure." The Supreme Court, by
a 6-3 majority, reversed the court of appeals,'" and held that the first
amendment does not protect the editorial process from discovery by defama-
tion plaintiffs." The Court stated that the concept of an editorial privilege
was inconsistent with the Court's prior defamation decisions.'' Further, the
Court found no clear and convincing reasons for changing existing constitu-
tional doctrine."
As the first. Supreme Court decision to discuss the concept of an editorial
privilege, this case is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects the Supreme
Court's continued retrenchment from the protection provided to the press in
New York Times. Thus, Herbert has theoretical implications for the balance to
be struck by future courts between the competing interests of compensating
victims of defamation, and promoting uninhibited debate of public issues.
Second, the case represents a setback for the press on a practical as well as a
theoretical level. The Court's decision could have a "chilling effect" on the
editorial decision making process, as editors realize that their conversations
are open to public disclosure.
Accordingly, this casenote will examine the first amendment implications
of the Herbert Court's refusal to grant an editorial privilege. It will briefly
discuss New York Times v. Sullivan, the first case to impose constitutional re-
straints on the law of defamation. The casenote will then explain the reason-
ing of the Herbert Court in refusing to grant a privilege and will present a
critical analysis of the Herbert decision. The casenote will conclude that the
importance of protecting the editorial integrity of the press warrants the in-
creased burden which the privilege would place on defamation plaintiffs.
8 Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court held that a public official
can recover defamation damages only upon proving that the defendant published with
"actual malice"-1 hal is, with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth. Id. at 279-80. Sec discussion of New York Times in text at notes 29-33 infra. The
"actual malice" standard was extended to cover defamation actions brought by public
figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130. 155 (1967). See text at note 34
infra. For purposes of this case Herbert was conceded to he a public figure. 73 F.R.D.
at 391. Consequently. he will be required to meet the standard of "actual malice" in
order to prevail at trial.
10 73 F.R.D. at 394.
" 569 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
12 Id. at 975.
" Herbert v. Lanclo, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
" Id. at 155, 175.
Id. at 169. See notes•79 & 81 infra.
'" Id. at 169-170.
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I. THE NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN BALANCE
Prior to 1964, the law of defamation was governed strictly by state law.
The Supreme Court had repeatedly refused to impose constitutional restraints
on the ground that the first amendment did not protect libelous statements."
In New York Times v. Sullivan," however, the Court reversed its earlier posi-
tion and concluded that state laws infringing free expression are not immune
from constitutional scrutiny merely because the affected speech is charac-
terized as "libelous."'"
New York Times was a defamation action brought by L. B. Sullivan—a city
commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama. 2 " Sullivan alleged that an advertise-
ment published by the New York Times had contained defamatory statements
concerning his official conduct. 2 ' The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a jury
verdict in Sullivan's favor of $500,000. 22
 Thus, the issue before the United
States Supreme Court was the extent to which the constitutional protection
for speech and press limits the states' power to award damages in a libel
action brought by a public official. 23 The Court held that the rule of law
imposed by the Alabama court 24 was constitutionally deficient for failing to
provide sufficient safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press. 25 In
reaching its decision, the Court noted that error in free debate is inevitable."
Further, the Court. recognized that requiring the press to guarantee the accu-
racy of every publication or else face financial punishment would result in
self-censorship and suppression of truthful statements. 27 The Court found
that such a chilling effect on truthful publication is inconsistent with the first
amendment and that a higher degree of protection should be afforded—at.
least in those cases in which the plaintiff is a public official and the defama-
17 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 11.10 (1961);
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beuharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pen-
nekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
'' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'" Id. at 269.
20 Id. at 256.
21 Id. The advertisment—entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices"—presented a
description of the alleged actions of the Montgomery Police during civil rights
marches. The ad complained of "terror" tactics against the demonstrators and particu-
larly against their leader Dr. Martin Luther King. Several of the allegations in the ad
turned out to be incorrect. Mr. Sullivan was the city commissioner in charge of super-
vising the activities of the Montgomery police. Id. at 256-57.
22 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 687, 144 So. 2d 25, 52
(1962).
23 376 U.S. at 25(1,
24 Id. at 267. Under Alabama law if a publication was libelous per se, the plain-
tiff simply needed to show that the defendant published the libelous statement con-
cerning the plaintiff. No evidence of injury was necessary as damages were presumed.
In addition, the defendant bore the burden of proving that the publication was true.
Id.
25 Id. at 264.
" Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
27
 376 U.S. at 279.
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Lion related to the performance of public duties. 28 Thus, the Court held that,
when the plaintiff is a public official, recovery is possible only if it is shown
with convincing clarity that the defendant published the defamatory statement
with "actual malice." 2 " The Court defined "actual malice" as either knowl-
edge that the publication was false, or reckless disregard of whether the pub-
lication was false or not." Later cases refined this definition and made clear
that "reckless disregard" referred to situations where the defendant enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication."'
The purpose of the "actual malice" standard as set out in New York Times
is to strike a balance between the conflicting interests involved in the defama-
tion context. On one hand, the strong interest in promoting a candid, robust
and uninhibited debate of public issues demands protection from state libel
laws. 32 On the ol her hand, the state's legitimate interest in protecting an indi-
vidual's reputation from unwarranted harm requires a means of compensa-
tion for defamation."" Through imposition of the "actual malice" standard,
the Court balanced the competing interests by providing increased protection
to first amendment values while still maintaining a cause of action for a de-
famed public official in limited circumstances.
The "actual malice" standard, adopted in New York Times, was extended
by the Court to cover defamation actions brought by public figures in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts."' The Court in Butts noted that, in many situations,
policy determinations which were traditionally channeled through governmen-
tal institutions arc now originated and implemented by the private sector."'
Additionally, the Court noted that private individuals who do not hold public
office are often intimately involved in the resolution of important public is-
sues or, by reason of their fame, influence events in areas of concern to the
society at large."" Such individuals, the Court stated, like public officials, play
an important. role in shaping policy and the public has a legitimate interest in
" Id at 2794i0.
25 Id .
:th
J 1 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). See also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334-35 n.6 (1974): Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74 (1964).
3 .2 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964): "Whether or not a
newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity
imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in
which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." hi.
:1" Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974):
"The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensa-
tion of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
hood. We would not lightly require the state to abandon this purpose for
... the individual's right to the protection of his own good name reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered lib-
erty .
Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
" 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
'' Id. at 163-64.




the conduct of such persons."' The Court concluded that uninhibited and
robust debate of the involvement of such public figures in public issues and
events is as crucial as in the case of public officials."
Following Butts, the Court reached the highwater mark in its protection
of the press from libel awards in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc."'' In
Rosenbloom, the Court concluded in a plurality opinion that the New York Times
standard of knowing or reckless falsity applied to an action brought by a pri-
vate individual if the defamatory statement concerned the plaintiff's involve-
ment in an event of public interest." The Court, thus, changed its focus
from the question of whether an individual was a public person to the ques-
tion of whether the story concerned a matter of public interest.
Since the Rosenbloom decision, however, the Court has steadily retrenched
on the protection afforded to the press from state libel laws. While the "actual
malice" standard articulated in New York Times has remained unchanged, the
Court, in a series of decisions, has constricted the number of potential plain-
tiffs to whom the standard will apply. In Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc,,a' the Court
retreated from the Rosenbloom plurality opinion and restricted the "actual
malice" standard to those cases brought by public officials or public figures.
The Court held that in actions brought by private figures the standard for
recovery was to be left to the state 42-provided the state did not allow recov-
ery without faulty " and provided the state did not allow punitive damages
unless the New York Times standard was met.'" Two years later, in Time, Inc.
v. Firestone,' the Court gave a very restrictive definition to "public figures,"
holding that a well known wealthy socialite was a private figure even though
she subscribed to a newspaper clipping service and had held press confer-
ences.'" Recently the Court further contracted the public figure definition in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire" and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n. 48 In Hutchinson
the Court held that a scientist who had received federal grants for research
was a private figure. 49 In Wokson the Court concluded that a person who
pleaded guilty to contempt charges during an espionage investigation was a
private figure." The Court continues to emphasize the language from Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.." that in order to become a public figure One must thrust
himself into the forefront of a public controversy for the purpose of influenc-
37 Id.
" 8 Id.
" 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
4 " Id. at 43-44.
4 ' 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
42
 Id. at 347.
as Id.
44 Id. at 350.
45 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
4" Id. at 453-54. 485.
47 443 U.S. 1 1 1 (1979).
4" 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
4"
 443 U.S. at 114.
7" 443 U.S. at 161.
'' 418 U.S. 323.
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ing the resolution of issues involved. 52 In Woiston, Mr. Justice Blackmun
noted with disapproval that the Court seemed to say that someone could only
become a public figure by literally or figuratively mounting a rostrum to ad-
vocate a particular view.' 3
Although the Court has severely limited the number of people to whom
the "actual malice" standard applies, the Court has not retreated from the
standard itself. When the "actual malice" standard is invoked it provides a
significant. degree of constitutional protection to the press. In order for a pub-
lic figure or public official to recover, the plaintiff must show with convincing
clarity"' that the defendant either knew the story was false or published with
reckless disregard for the truth. 55 It is no longer enough for the public per-
son to merely show that the publisher was negligent. The effect of the "actual
malice" standard has been to revolutionize the law of defamation.'" The
locus in defamation actions has shifted from the defendant's attitude toward
the plaintiff, to the defendant's degree of knowledge of the statement's prob-
able falsity. 57 This change in focus, however, left open the question of how
far a defamation plaintiff can intrude into the editorial decision making proc-
" Id. at 345. The dual standard of liability created by New York Times and
Gertz has led to considerable litigation over the definition of public officials, public
figures and private figures. See, e.g., WoIsm!' v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S.
I 57 (1979) (individual convicted of contempt of court during hearings on communist
spies held not a public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxniire, 443 U.S. I 1 1 (1979) (scientist.
using federal grant for research held not a public official nor a public figure); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wife of a member of a wealthy industrial family
held not a public figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (attorney in
highly publicized case held not a public figure); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (college football coach held a public figure); Applcyard v. Transameri-
Call Press, Inc.. 539 F.2c1 1026 (4th Cir. 1976) (truckdriver who attempted to change
1.C.C. regulations conceded to be a public figure); jenoll v. Hearst Corp., 453 F.
Stipp. 541 (D. Md. 1978) (undercover police informant held neither a public figure
nor a public official); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978)
(hoodlum attempting to get a job as a "hit man" with a police "fencing' operation
held a public figure); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Stipp. 254
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (professional football player held a public figure); Rosanova v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (individual with extensive, well
publicized ties to underworld figures held a public figure); Foster v. Laredo Newspap-
ers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976) (civil engineer engaged in consulting for county
government held not a public official nor a public figure).
53
 443 U.S. at 169.
54
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.
5`' At common-law the plaintiff merely needed to show that the defendant
published a defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff. Strict liability was the stan-
dard; no showing of negligence or recklnessness was necessary. Evidence was unneces-
sary on damages as they were presumed. The defendant. could avoid liability by prov-
ing that the statement was conditionally privileged. The plaintiff could overcome such
a privilege by introducing evidence of "common-law malice"—spite or ill-will towards
the plaintiff. See generally W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 114, at 776, § 115 at
794-95 (4th ed. 1971); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975).
57 Cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974) (news-
paper publishing story showing plaintiff in a "false light" found liable for invasion of
privacy).
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ess in attempting to meet his burden of establishing "actual malice." This
issue was presented directly in Herbert v. Lando."
II. THE HERBERT DEcIstoN
A. The Lower Courts
In Herbert the district court'`' was confronted with the narrow issue of the
appropriate boundaries of discovery in a defamation action brought by a
public figure. After noting that the case was substantially one of first impres-
sion,G° the court. concluded that the questions asked by Herbert were permis-
sible." In reaching its decision, the court found that questions as to the de-
fendant's subjective state of mind were crucially important to the plaintiff's
case.° 2 The court rejected the defendant's claim of constitutional protection
stating that it found nothing in the first amendment which required it to
increase the plaintiff's already heavy burden of proof by creating barriers
behind which malicious publication may go undetectecl." 3 The district court
certified the case to the court of appeals° 4 for interlocutory appeal" and a
divided, three-judge court reversed. The appellate court concluded that grant-
ing Herbert's discovery request would permit an unacceptable chilling intru-
sion into the editorial process."
Both Chief Judge Kaufman, in the opinion of the court, and Judge
Oakes, in a concurring opinion, placed great emphasis on the so called 'right
of access" cases: Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo," and Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee." Tornilk struck down a
"right to reply" statute which gave any political candidate who had been
criticized by a newspaper the right to free space in the newspaper to print a
reply." CBS upheld a network policy to arbitrarily refuse all editorial adver-
tisements.'" In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the choice of mate-
rial to be published (or broadcast) constitutes the exercise of editorial judg-
ment and that governmental regulation of this process would be inconsistent.
with the first amendment.n The appellate court in Herbert reasoned that the
Tornillo and CBS cases supported the proposition that governmental interfer-
58
 441 U.S. 154 (1979).
5"
 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"" Id. at 393-94. The court noted that only one other case, Buckley v. Vidal, 50
F.R.D. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), had considered the appropriate boundaries of . discovery in
a public figure delaniation action. Id.
61
 73 F.R.D. at 395.
62 Id. at 393.
63 Id. at 394.
64 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
65
 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) (1948).
66 568 F.2d at 984.
67 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
"8
 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
6" 418 U.S. at 247, 258.
7"
 412 U.S. at 114, 121.
71 418 U.S. at 258, 412 U.S. at 120-21.
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ence with the editorial judgment process through intrusive discovery would
also violate the first amendment. 72
The privilege envisioned by the court. of appeals protected essentially two
facets of the editorial process, the prepublication decision making process,
and the mental process of the journalist in formulating a story. The court of
appeals suggested that a privilege covering the first component of the edito-
rial process—the prepublication editorial decision making process—was one
which would protect discussions among editors, reporters, and other members
of the media organization in deciding which sources to believe and which
material to publish." Applied to the Herbert case, the privilege would cover
questions directed 10 the conversations between Lando and Wallace concern-
ing the material to be included ol excluded from the broadcast." Addition-
ally, the court of appeals suggested that a privilege covering the second com-
ponent of the editorial process—the journalist's mental process in formulating
a story—was one which would shield the journalist's motivation, conclusions,
and his basis for reaching conclusions.' Applied to the Herbert case, the
privilege would cover Lando's conclusions regarding leads to be pursued; his
conclusions as to the veracity of people interviewed; the basis for his conclu-
sions regarding the veracity of people interviewed; and his motivation for in-
cluding or excluding certain material.'"
B. The Supreme Court — Majority Opinion
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court directly addressed
the issue of whether the first amendment precludes discovery of the editorial
process and mandates the application of an editorial privilege. 77 The Court
concluded that such a privilege is not required, authorized or presaged by the
Court's prior cases.' In its discussion, the Court noted that cases decided
both before and alter New York Times had allowed defamation plaintiffs to
prove the necessary state of mind by direct inquiry into the editorial process."
72 568 F.2d at 978-79 (Kaufman, C.J.) & 994-95 (Oakes, J., concurring).
7 " Id. at 980, 993-04.
" In other words, the privilege would cover category number four based on
the grouping of the court of appeals. See note 6 supra.
" See 568 F.2d at 980, 984 (Kaufman, C.J.) & 995 (Oakes, J., concurring).
Basically, it would cover the "why'' questions but not factual questions of the who,
what, when, where type. 441 U.S. at 171 n.19.
7 " Thus, the privilege would cover categories I, 2, 3 and 5 based on the group-
ing of the court of appeals. See note 6 Supra.
77 441 U.S. at 155. In its discussion, the Supreme Court recognized that the
privilege envisioned by the court of appeals would protect essentially two facets of the
editorial process—the prepublication editorial decisionmaking process and the jour-
nalist's mental process in formulating a story. Id. at 158, 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and 206 (Nlarshall, J., dissenting); see 568 F.2d at 980 and 995.
78 441 U.S. at 169.
Id. at 165, 158-60. For examples of common law cases which accepted evi-
dence going directly to the editorial process, see, e.g., Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis,
271 Ala. 474, 498, 124, So. 2d 441, 461, (1960); Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d
161, 169, 217 P.2d 687, 693 (1950). See aLso Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155
A. 819 (1931); Scott v. "limes-Mirror Co., 181 Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919).
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For example, the Court observed that plaintiffs in common law defamation
cases frequently had to prove improper motivation on the part of the pub-
lisher in order to overcome a conditional privilege." Similarly, plaintiffs in
cases decided under the New York Times standard must establish the subjective
state of mind of the defendant.' The Court noted that none of these cases
suggested that the first amendment prohibited proving the requisite state of
mind by direct inquiry into the editorial process."
After determining that prior defamation cases did not mandate an edito-
rial privilege, the Court reviewed the "right of access cases" " which the court
of appeals had relied upon in granting the privilege. The Court noted that
the "right of access" cases had dealt with the issue of government control of
material to be published or broadcast." In those cases the Court had refused
to allow such control because it constituted a prior restraint on the content of
publications." The Herbert Court concluded that the bar to government con-
trol of program selection was not tantamount to a holding that the editorial
process was completely immune from inquiry."
Despite the lack of precedential support for the privilege, the respon-
dents argued that the important first amendment values to be served by the
privilege warranted a modification of existing first amendment doctrine. The
Court disagreed, however, and found both practical and theoretical problems
with the proposed privilege. On a practical level, the Court noted that the
privilege would seriously hinder the ability of a defamation plaintiff to estab-
lish "actual malice." 87
 Specifically, the plaintiff would be precluded from
proving knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by direct evi-
dence. Instead, the plaintiff would be forced to rely completely on cir-
cumstantial evidence." Although the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff
would rarely prove his case from the defendant's own statements, the Court
observed that such direct evidence would be extremely relevant."s Moreover,
the Court reasoned that the boundaries of the proposed editorial privilege
would be difficult to define." For example, the Court stated it would be
80
 441 U.S. at 165.
" Id. at 1641. For a case decided after New York Times which accepted evi-
dence going directly to the editorial process, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
391-94 (1967). See also Curtis Publishing co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 158-59 (1967).
82
 441 U.S. at 160.
83 Id. at 166-67. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
84
 441 U.S. at 167.
85 Id. at 167-68.
" Id. at 168. In addition, the Court noted that the Tornillo case and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), were decided on the same day. In Gertz, the
Court recapped the recent developments in the relationship between the first amend-
ment and the law of defamation. Yet Gertz did not mention the establishment of an
editorial privilege in a companion case that would severely restrict the ability of a
defamation plaintiff to prove "actual malice." 441 U.S. at 168.
87 441 U.S. at 170.
88 Id.
"" Id.
"" Id. Although the Herbert Court did not discuss the extent of the proposed
editorial privilege, the Court did refer to the privilege as an absolute privilege. 441
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unclear whether the privilege would extend to cover conversations between
reporters and third parties."' Also, the boundary would be difficult to draw
between a reporter's beliefs, which would be privileged, and a reporter's
knowledge, which would not be privileged. 92
In addition to these practical problems, the Court found no persuasive
theoretical basis on which to uphold the privilege. The Court rejected the
contention that the privilege was necessary to prevent an unacceptable "chil-
ling effect" on the editorial process." Instead, the Court concluded that al-
lowing plaintiffs to establish their cases by direct evidence was consistent with
the balance struck in its prior decisions allowing a public figure plaintiff to
recover upon establishing the requisite degree of culpability." Furthermore,
the Court stated it was difficult to see why establishing liability through direct
evidence would produce a "chilling effect" while establishing liability by cir-
cumstantial evidence would not." On the contrary, the Court concluded that
direct evidence would lead to more accurate results as it would allow the de-
fendant to explain why he relied upon a particular source." The Court
acknowledged the relationship between frank prepublication discussion and
sound decision making, but concluded that exposure to liability in cases of
knowing or reckless error would encourage the media to resort to prepublica-
tion precautions." 7
After deciding the constitutional question, the Court reviewed the issue of
discovery abuse in .defamation cases. The Court noted that discovery costs had
soared in all areas of the law, not merely in libel litigation." In addition, the
U.S. at 158, 169. In addition, it appears that the court of appeals envisioned an abso-
lute privilege that would apply at trial as well as in discovery. Judge Kaufman, in the
opinion of the Court, referred only to an editorial privilege, but the "chilling effect"
rationale which his opinion was based upon would seem to require that the privilege
be absolute and that it be extended to trial. 568 F.2d at 980. Judge Oakes, in a concur-
ring opinion, stated in dictum that the privilege would apply both during discovery
and at trial. 568 F.2d at 995 n.38.
The only court to consider the issue under the appellate court decision found the
privilege to apply at trial. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Stipp. 1341, 1359
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (on reargument). See also Comment, Herbert v. Lando: Reporter's
Privilege from Revealing the Editorial Process in a Defamation Suit, 78 COLUN1. L. REV. 448,
453 n.24 (1978).
"' 441 U.S. at 171.
"' Id. at 170. As previously noted, the privilege envisioned by the court of
appeals would cover the journalist's beliefs, motivations and thought process but would
not cover factual material in the journalist's possession. See text at note 75 supra. For
purposes of this note, the court of appeals' definition of "editorial privilege" is
adopted.
" 3
 Id. at 171-73.
"4
 Id. at 172.
95 Id .
" 6 Id. at 172-73. For example, the Court noted that if a reporter has two con-
tradictory reports about the plaintiff, one of which is false and damaging, and only the
false one is published, the reporter would want to testify to explain why the false
report was published. As support for this point, the Court noted that. in many defama-
tion cases (including New York Times) it is the defendant who first presents direct evi-
dence about the editorial process in order to establish good faith. Id. at 173 n.21.
"7
 Id. at 173.
"" Id. at 176.
_July 19801	 CASENOTES	 1233
Court stated that, in view of the increased burden of proof imposed by New
York Times, it was not surprising that defamation plaintiffs resorted to in-
creased discovery." The Court concluded that an editorial privilege would
not shield the press from the high cost of litigation—indeed only a complete
immunity from libel actions would accomplish this.'" Further, the Court
noted that district courts already have the necessary tools to prevent discovery
abuse, and that a separate directive to limit discovery in libel actions is un-
necessary. 1 " 1
C. The Dissents
Mr. Justice Brennan filed an opinion dissenting in part from the majority
opinion. Although Justice Brennan agreed that a privilege was not necessary
to protect the journalist's mental processes, he strongly favored the creation of'
a qualified privilege covering prepublication editorial discussions. 102 Justice
Brennan began his analysis by noting that the Court had in the past recog-
nized evidentiary privileges in order to promote significant public policy
goals.'" He further noted that the press had served a historically important.
role in disseminating information and in checking government abuse.'" jus-
tice Brennan argued that the editorial privilege would act as a shield for the
press in carrying out its function and would therefore benefit the public at
large.'"
While Justice Brennan favored the concept of some form of editorial
privilege, he rejected the idea that the privilege should extend to cover the
journalist's mental process. Justice Brennan found "implausible" the appellate
court's conclusion that journalists would he "chilled in the very process of
thought."'" He noted that New York Times called for proof of the publisher's
subjective state of mind. Any chilling effect, he concluded, would emanate
from the substantive standard of New York Times and not from the means by
which the publisher's state of mind was established." 7
Although Justice Brennan was not persuaded that it was necessary to pro-
tect the journalist's mental process, he found the reasoning for a privilege
protecting the exchange of ideas between newsmen compelling. 708 Justice
99 Id.
Ino
'II Id. at 177. In a separate concurring opinion Justice Powell agreed that an
editorial privilege was not warranted. justice Powell added, however, that in weighing
the relevance of discovery requests the district courts should give careful consideration
to the impact such requests have on first amendment values. Id. at 177-80.
" 2 Id. at 181.
L "3 Id. at 183. Brennan noted, for example, that Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947), established a privilege for the attorney's work product and Roviaru v. Un-
ited States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), recognized a qualified informer's privilege.
104 Id. at 188-89 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978)).
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967); Grosiean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
105 441 U.S. at 189.
'"" Id. at 192 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977)).
197
 441 U.S. at 193.
"" Id. at 195.
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Brennan analogized such a privilege to the executive privilege. He argued
that the rationale supporting the executive privilege—to foster a more candid
interchange of ideas in the policy making process—applies as well to the
editorial decision making process)" Although Justice Brennan would have
granted a privilege to the editorial decision making process, he argued that
the privilege should be qualified and give way if the plaintiff established a
prima facie case of defamation. This would lessen the burden on defamation
plaintiffs while still providing some degree of protection to the press.'"
In a separate dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Stewart observed that. courts
frequently have confused the distinction between actual malice (knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) and common law malice (spite, ill-
will or hostility).`" Justice Stewart concluded that the majority in Herbert fell
victim to this error. Although the Court recited the correct constitutional
standard, Justice Stewart stated that the result in Herbert could only be
reached by confusing the two meanings of malice."' Justice Stewart argued
that the editorial privilege question need not be reached by the Court because
the discovery requests in dispute were clearly irrelevant to the case and there-
fore could have been denied on nonconstitutional grounds." 3
Mr. justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He noted
that insulating the press from ultimate liability in defamation actions is not.
enough to avert self censorship if the courts allow unrestrained discovery. ' 14
Rather, the courts must consider modern clay procedural realities in attempt-
ing to maintain the balance struck in New York Times. " 5 While acknowledging
that discovery abuse exists in several areas of the law, Justice Marshall ob-
served that discovery abuse is of particular concern in defamation cases for
two reasons. First, abuse is more likely to occur because plaintiffs are often
motivated by the desire for revenge rather than by the prospects for suc-
cess.'" Second, the result of unrestrained discovery in defamation cases is
l"" Id. at 197.
nu Id. at 197-98. In applying these principles to the facts of the case, justice
Brennan found that only questions falling into category number four—conversations
between Lando and Wallace about the matter to be included or excluded from the
program—would be covered by the privilege. Brennan would have remanded the case
to the district court for a determination whether the respondents had waived the
privilege by previously answering questions within the protected category. if not, the
district court would determine if Herbert could overcome the privilege by making a
prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood. Id. at 198-99.
"' Id. at 199-200. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6 (1970) (in public figure defamation suit trial judge instructed jury plaintiff
could recover if defendant published with spite, hostility or deliberate intention to
harm). Id. at 10. Cf. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281
(1974) (lower court mistakenly defined actual malice as hatred, spite. ill will or desire
to injure).
" I 441 U.S. at 200-01.
"" Id. at 201-02. justice Stewart would have remanded the case to the district
court with a direction to strictly review the relevance of the discovery requests in view
of the constitutional criteria set out in New York Times.
1 " Id. at 204.
117, Id .
1 Id.
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more severe than in other contexts because it impacts on first amendment.
values." 7
 Justice Marshall argued that such abuse may impose a degree of
self-censorship on the press as publishers refrain from publishing truthful in-
formation in order to avert the expense and intrusion of roving discovery)"
Justice Marshall charged that the Court had abdicated its responsibility by
failing to take action.'" While acknowledging the problem of discovery abuse
in defamation cases, the court left the Hickman 72° directive, which calls for a
broad and liberal interpretation of discovery rules, unqualified. justice Mar-
shall would have directed the district courts to use a strict standard of rele-
vance in reviewing discovery requests in defamation cases. 121
 In addition to
placing strictures on discovery, Justice Marshall contended that some form of
editorial privilege was warranted. He agreed with Justice Brennan that the
journalist's mental process need not be shielded as the discovery of this in-
formation would have no incremental chilling effect over that contemplated
by New York Times. 122
 In Justice Marshall's view the editorial decision making
process, however, warranted protection, because exposure of such conversa-
tions would inhibit the candid exchange of ideas.'" In contrast to Justice
Brennan, Justice Marshall argued that this should be an absolute privilege.
Otherwise, journalists would not know in advance whether their discussions
would he subject to discovery and the "chilling effect" would not be
averted.'"
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION AND ITS IMPACT
A. Herbert and the New York Times Balance
The Court concluded that an editorial privilege protecting the editorial
decision making process would be inconsistent with the Court's prior
decisions.'" An analysis of the editorial privilege's effect on the interests
promoted and protected in the New York Times v. Sullivan 126
 case, however.
reveals that the privilege would in fact. have been consistent with the first
amendment values articulated in New York Times of promoting a robust and
uninhibited debate of public issues. The New York Times Court sought to strike
a balance between an individual's right to protect his reputation and the first.
amendment interest in freedom of speech. In reaching this balance, the Court
observed that the interest in guaranteeing an uninhibited debate was of
paramount importance. 127
 Yet the protection from ultimate liability provided
by the New York Times standard is insufficient to prevent a "chilling effect" on
17 Id. at 205.
IIH id .
116 Id.
1211 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495. 507 (1947).
131 441 U.S. at 206.
' 22 Id. at 207.
' 2" Id. at 208-09.
124 Id. am 209.
125 441 U.S. am 169.
121 ' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127 Id. at 270.
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the press if newsroom discussions are revealed through the discovery process.
If editors and newsmen are aware that their thoughts, discussions and notes
are open to discovery, they may well be less candid in discussions among
themselves. For example, in Herbert several witnesses presented diametrically
opposed versions of the same story. It would be natural in such a case for the
journalist and the editor to express reservations among themselves as to the
truth of all sources, including the one they finally decided to adopt.. Allowing
these initial reservations to come out in court will be extremely damaging on
the issue of actual malice, even though the editor eventually made a good
faith determination that the source was reliable. Therefore, if an editor has
doubts as to the veracity of a source of a story, the editor will be wise after
Herbert to remain silent.
Such reticence on the part of editors will ultimately interfere with the
first amendment interest in promoting an accurate news media.'" The Court
in Herbert acknowledged the relationship between prepublication editorial dis-
cussion and a more accurate press.'" However, the Court concluded that
exposing the editorial process to discovery would have no effect on prepubli-
cation precautions)" Instead, the Court reasoned that because there could
be liability for knowing or reckless error there was an incentive for newsmen
to engage in prepublication precautions)" However, the Court's statement
"given exposure to liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is
even more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank
interchange of fact and opinion," 132 says little more than that the New York
Times standard promotes prepublication precautions. This does not appear to
be the case. In any balancing situation, sacrifices are made to accommodate
competing interests. One of the sacrifices involved with the New York Times
standard is that it does not encourage a thorough editorial decision making
process. Under the "actual malice" standard, negligence is not punished and
diligence is not rewarded, but rather liability turns solely on the subjective
knowledge of falsity or probable falsity on the part of the publisher)" The
1214 See, e.g., 441  U.S. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)): The rfirsti
amendment embraces the public's interest in accurate and effective reporting by the
news media."
' 2 " 441 U.S. at 173.
13 )) Id. at 174.
131 Id .
132 Id .
13" The courts have consistently held that reckless disregard for the truth is not
a "super negligence- standard. Instead the term has been defined as publication with a
"high degree of awareness of ... probably falsity," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74 (1964), or publication when "the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication.'' St. Amain v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). See,
e.g., Dickey v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 583 F.2c1 1221, 1227 (3d Cir.
1978); Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Stipp. 285, 299 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Lorentz v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 472 F. Stipp. 946, 952 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Adams v. Frontier
Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 564 (Wyo. 1976). But see Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414
F.2(1 324, 343 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. (ferried, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970): "Recklessness is, after
all, only negligence raised to a higher power." Id.
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Supreme Court., in fact, acknowledged in St. Amant v. Thompson 134 that the
"actual malice" standard may not promote a thorough editorial process, but.
determined that this sacrifice was necessary so that more protection could be
afforded to first amendment rights than would be possible under a mere
negligence standard.' 35
 The effect of the actual malice standard, however, is
that the more editors resort to prepublication precautions the more likely they
are to obtain the subjective state of mind necessary to comprise "actual
malice." Consequently, through discovery of the editorial process, the respon-
sible journalist employing vigorous precautionary procedures, may be placed
in a more vulnerable position than a less conscientious journalist. For exam-
ple, if a newspaper prints a story defaming a public figure based solely upon
an unverified source"' and with no discussion among editors as to possible
falsity, there would probably be no liability. This was, in fact, the situation in
St. Amant v. Thompson 137
 where the defendant published a statement accusing
the plaintiff of accepting bribes. 138
 The publisher had relied solely on the
affidavit of a union official and the record was silent as to the union official's
reputation for truthfulness.' 39
 The publisher did not verify the statement with
people in the union office who might have known the facts, nor did he give
any consideration to whether or not the statements defamed Thompson. 140
Nevertheless, the Court held that this combination of circumstances did not
constitute reckless disregard for the truth."'
''a 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
' 35 Id. at 731-32:
It may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages
the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be de-
termined by the defendant's testimony that he published the statement in
good thith and unaware of its probable falsity. Concededly the reckless dis-
regard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule
that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the
prudent publisher. But New York Times and succeeding cases have em-
phasized that the stake of the people in public business and the conduct of
public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the stan-
dard of ordinary care would protect against self-censorship and thus
adequately implement First Amendment policies.
Id.
""' Failure to verify sources does not by itself constitute reckless disregard for
the truth. This is assuming that the source is not patently unreliable (such as an
anonymous telephone caller) and that the story is not inherently improbable. St.
Amain v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732-33. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1946) (failure by publisher to verify content of advertisement when there
was contradictory information in publisher's own files held not reckless disregard);
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks. 380 U.S. 81 (1967) (on the record before the
Court, failure to make prior investigation did not constitute reckless disregard); Dickey
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978) (failure of pub-
lisher to verify story not reckless disregard).
' 37
 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
" 8 Id. at 728-29.





BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1223
Similarly, in Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co.'" a public figure plaintiff
brought an action against a local radio station for broadcasting a defamatory
falsehood on a talk-show.'" The defamatory statement was made by an
anonymous caller into the program. 144 The plaintiff alleged reckless disre-
gard on the part of the broadcaster in failing to use an electronic delay system
whereby the station could evaluate callers' remarks.'" The court held that
Adams could not recover because the broadcaster had deprived itself of the
opportunity to evaluate the information published and to form a conclusion
as to falsity or a doubt with respect to truth.' 4 " The court held that the legal
effect of this was to preclude a finding of actual malice.'
These cases reveal that. the irresponsible publisher can often avoid liabil-
ity merely by failing to engage in prepublication precautions. On the other
hand, if a newspaper prints a story such as the one in St. Arrant, yet prior to
publication the editors engage in vigorous prepublication precautions, there
could be a finding of liability. The editorial discussions would be open to
discovery and these discussions could prove very damaging—particularly if'
the editors had discussed among themselves the possibility that the source of
the story may be inaccurate. This leaves the anomalous situation whereby the
least responsible journalist is the least likely to suffer a defamation judgment.
Such a situation will discourage the verbal testing, probing, and discussion of
hypotheses and alternatives engaged in by responsible journalists. Further,
such an inhibition on candid editorial decision making may lead to a less ac-
curate press. This result—a "chilling effect" on editorial decision making and
a less accurate press—is exactly what the New York Times standard was de-
signed to prevent."' Thus, the Court in Herbert, by refusing to grant protec-
tion to the editorial decision making process, ignored both the first amend-
ment values which led to the adoption of the New York Times standard and the
inherent problems which have developed under the New York Times standard.
B. Herbert and the Access Cases
The court of appeals decision in Herbert, which mandated an editorial
privilege, relied heavily on two Supreme Court decisions protecting a pub-
lisher's right to select material to be published. These are the so-called "right.
of access cases," Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo ''" and Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee)" The Tornillo case in-
volved a statute requiring newspapers to give a politican, who the paper had
criticized, the right to reply. The CBS case raised the question of whether a
broadcaster could unilaterally refuse to accept paid political advertisements.
142 555 1) .2(1 556 (Wyo. 1976).
'' Id. at 557-58.
144 id,
'' Id. at 558.
141 ' Id. at 564.
147 Id.
'' 376 U.S. at 706.
"" 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
E5" 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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In both cases, the Supreme Court held that governmental control over the
selection of material to be published would violate the first amendment. While
the access cases presented a somewhat different legal issue than the question
of editorial privilege, the court of appeals noted that they nevertheless stand
for the proposition that the editorial decision making process warrants some
degree of protection from governmental interference."'
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the reasoning of the appellate court,
stated that the holdings of the "access" cases, that the government could not
dictate what material must or must not be printed, neither expressly nor im-
pliedly suggested that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry what-
soever.'" Thus, the Court in Herbert appears to have unduly limited the ac-
cess cases to their factual settings and to have impliedly rejected language in
the opinions which called for a broader interpretation. For example, in Tor-
nillo the Court stated:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or
unfair—constitutes the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this cru-
cial process can be exercised consistent with first amendment
guarantees of a free press ... 
. 153
This language would certainly indicate that the editorial process was entitled
to some degree of protection from government intrusion. Such intrusion may
take the form of legislative action, as in Tornillo, or judicial action, as in the
present case.'"
In the access cases the government was not allowed to make the judgment
as to the content of material to be published because such a judgment would
be an impermisible intrusion on the decision making function of the editors.
The compelled disclosure of editorial conclusions, opinions and contentions,
however, may result in as great a degree of government intrusion. The jour-
nalist will be forced through the discovery process to publicly justify why a
difficult decision was made as it was. The press is then left in the position of
explaining the rationale and the good faith of a judgment which the trier of
fact knows turned out to be wrong. Thus, the disclosure of the journalist's
thoughts, opinions and conclusions may result in a distortion of the editorial
process and an unwarranted finding of "actual malice."
The potential for distortion of the journalist's judgment process is par-
ticularly acute in the situation where the press has taken an unpopular stand
and the plaintiff is a powerful public official or popular public figure. 15 ' In
151 568 F.2d at 979, 990.
'" 441 U.S. at 168.
0" 418 U.S. at 258.
'"4 568 F.2d at 987.
' 5 ' The facts of the Herbert case present a classic example. Herbert's allegations
that his superior officers had covered up war crimes were sympathetically received by
a large portion of the American public. The country was increasingly disillusioned with
the war in Viet Nam and Herbert became an instant hero with the press and the
public. The viewpoint expressed by "Sixty Minutes", that the Army had been telling
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such cases the press may be discouraged from taking an unpopular position
for fear of liability resulting from a distortion of the editorial process. Thus,
the judicial intrusion into the editorial decision making process through
forced discovery may result in an indirect control over the content of material
to be published which is similar in effect to the government intrusion rejected
in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting.
C. Discovery Abuse
After deciding the constitutional question, the court reviewed the prob-
lems of discovery abuse in defamation litigation. Ever since the Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor directed that the discovery rules be given a
broad and liberal interpretation, an increasing problem with discovery abuse
has existed.'''? A plaintiff with a facially sufficient complaint can tie up a
defendant indefinitely in expensive, time consuming discovery. The Court
correctly noted that discovery abuse is certainly not restricted to the law of
defamation, but the Court failed to note that a qualitative difference exists
between discovery abuse in defamation cases which serves to promote self-
censorship and discovery abuse in other areas of the law. There is increased
cause for concern when the harassment interferes with fundamental first
amendment rights.' 5 8
In addition, the Court failed to recognize that libel litigation is particu-
larly susceptible to such abuse. As justice Marshall pointed out,'" the plaintiff
may often be pursuing the suit for punitive reasons rather than out of a de-
the truth all along and that Herbert had duped the American public, was not a very
popular position to take. In light of the Herbert decision, the thoughts, conclusions,
and opinions of the program's editors will be open to review. If the allegations of
"Sixty Minutes" turn out to be false, it may well be difficult to keep the prejudicial
effect of the context from distorting a review of the editorial judgment process.
"" 329 U.S. 495 (1947). "[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment." Id. at 507. Accord, Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
114-15 (1964).
See, e.g., Burger, Agenda For 2000 AM.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976); Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint
For The Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288-90 (1978); Pollack,
Discovery—Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1979).
1 " Courts have often made the distinction between statutes infringing on fun-
damental rights as opposed to property rights. For example, the district court in Har-
ris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), in holding a statute unconstitutionally vague stated: "[W :le have learned that
statutes seeking to regulate in the area of the First Amendment are held to a more
stringent standard of clarity and precision than is required of statutes that undertake
to lay down rules for the marketplace." 281 F. Supp. at 511. Similarly, the courts have
imposed a stricter standard of review in equal protection analysis when the state action
infringes on fundamental rights as opposed to property rights. See, L. TRIBE, AmE.Fti-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-2, 16-6, 16-7 (1978). For a commentary critical of the
fundamental interest, property right dichotomy, see Gunther, Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection., 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8-10, 37-48 (1972).
"9 441 U.S. at 204.
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sire to be compensated for a loss.t`i 0 Therefore, even the knowledge that the
defendant will ultimately prevail on motion for summary judgment may not
deter a plaintiff from pursing a suit brought both for retaliation and deter-
rence."' Moreover, such retaliatory tactics arc undoubtedly effective. The
cost of defending a defamation action is substantial and the action cannot be
taken lightly, no matter how frivolous the claim, in view of the dollar amounts
often involved. A public figure or public official may well believe that a pub-
lisher who has been forced to defend a publication in a defamation action will
think twice about publishing another critical article. Consequently, the mere
pendency of a defamation suit may often serve a plaintiff's purposes regard-
less of the chances for ultimate success. The courts have repeatedly recog-
nized this principle, and, consequently, have made liberal use of summary
judgment procedures in defamation actions.' 62
 The fact that the publisher
can eventually resort to summary judgment procedures, however, is insuffi-
cient protection if the plaintiff is allowed to harass the publisher through un-
restrained discovery." 3
 For example, in the present case the deposition of
Lando alone has taken over a year. Lando has been deposed twenty-six times.
"'" See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx.
	 RE v. 422, 435
(1975).
'"' A possible example of such retaliatory tactics is Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's,
442 F. Stipp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In that case, Barron's, a weekly financial magazine,
published a critical analysis of an upcoming public stock offering by Reliance. Reliance
responded by filing a defamation action against Barron's for $37,500,000. Id. at
1344-45. Barron's eventually prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at
1353. This suit appears to have been baseless and a reasonable inference is that it was
brought solely to deter Barron's from publishing future articles critical of Reliance
Insurance Co. This type of retaliation tactic may, in fact, have instigated the Herbert
suit. When Herbert first came out with his story he was an instant celebrity and re-
ceived very sympathetic treatment from the press. Later, however, when the Army
cleared Herbert's superiors from the charges of' a coverup, the press began to probe
further and question Herbert's charges. This probing ultimately led to the "Sixty Mi-
nutes" segment and subsequently to Herbert's suit. Since Herbert instituted the suit,
the press has treated Herbert more sympathetically. For an example of such sympathe-
tic treatment, see Boston Globe, Nov. 9, 1979, at 2, Col. 1. Once again, it would be
reasonable to infer that the press has been reluctant to criticize Herbert's story in view
of the fate which has befallen "Sixty Minutes."
142 See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keough, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir.
1966):
In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essen-
tial. For the stake here, if the harassment succeeds, is free debate. One of
the purposes of the Times principle ... is to prevent persons from being
discouraged in the full and free exercise of their First Amendment rights
with respect to the conduct of their government Unless persons, in-
cluding newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights are
assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become
self-censors.
Id. See also, Davis v. National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. La.
1970) (failure to dismiss a libel suit might necessitate long and expensive trial proceed-
ings and result in chilling effect of litigation); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d 1306,
1310 (La. 1978) (to allow defamation plaintiff to avoid summary judgment by putting
forth minimum of evidence woukl be to invoke the "chilling effect" of trial).
"" Of course, publishers may resort to suits for malicious prosecution as a rem-
edy for frivolous libel actions.
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His testimony covers nearly 3,000 pages of transcript and he has provided
240 exhibits.'" Yet. the Court has required him to answer still more ques-
tions. The attorneys' fees associated with defending such an action are stag-
gering. Faced with such costs—rising attorneys' fees, time spent away from
work, and exposure of sensitive information—many editors may make publi-
cation judgments based not on the potential for liability but rather on the
expense of vindication. Even though confident of their ability to prevail at
trial or on motion For summary judgment, editors may steer far wide of the
unlawful zone."'
While acknowledging that discovery abuse exists in defamation cases, the
Herbert Court did not conclude that an editorial privilege was necessary to
cure such abuse. Instead, the Court concluded that: I) an editorial privilege
would not cure the abuse—only complete immunity from libel would solve
the problem; ' 1 ' 1 2) the district court judges already have sufficient tools to
cure discovery abuse; 1i 7 and 3) a remedy lies elsewhere in major changes in
the rules of civil procedures.'" The Court's reasoning in all three instances is
partially correct but ultimately unpersuasive. First, while it is true that the
privilege would not completely solve the problem of discovery abuse in defa-
mation cases, it would be a major step in that. direction. The privilege would
considerably lessen the discovery burden on publishers; the reason for this is
obvious. A defamation action under the New York Times standard requires the
plaintiff to prove four basic elements: a defamatory statement; publication;
falsity; and actual malice.'" The only one of these elements requiring the
plaintiff to receive a substantial amount of information from the defendant is
"actual malice." If the Court had adopted the privilege, the plaintiff would
have had to prove "actual malice" by circumstantial evidence. The defendant
would then only be required to supply the plaintiff with factual material in
the defendant's possession.
The Court's second assertion—that the district courts have sufficient tools
to solve the problem—is also questionable. Physical limitations prevent the
courts from taking a major role in superintending discovery proceedings.' 7 °
Further, the broad Hickman directive requiring a liberal interpretation of dis-
covery rules would appear to limit the district courts' ability to deny discovery
requests. Finally, the Court's third reason for refusing to take action to curb
discovery abuse—that a solution lies elsewhere—is equally unpersuasive."'
1 " 568 F.2d at 982.
1 " 5 376 U.S. at 279.
"" 441 U.S. at 176.
" 7 Id. at 177.
Id.
1 "" Id. at 199.
17 " See, e.g., Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View From The Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245
(1978).
171 As justice Marshall noted, 441 U.S. at 205, the Court's assertion that the
district courts have sufficient tools to solve the problem seems somewhat inconsistent
with the Court's further assertion that a solution to the problem lies elsewhere. If, as
the Court stated, the district courts have the necessary tools to solve the problem, there




The fact that the Court acknowledged a serious problem with discovery abuse,
which in defamation cases has an impact on the first amendment, suggests
that the Court should take a leadership role in finding a solution. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted and are interpreted by the Court.'"
Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, charged that by failing to take action
to stem discovery abuse the Court was abdicating its leadership responsibil-
ity.' 7 " Justice Marshall recommended that the Court instruct the district
courts to disregard the Hickman directive in defamation cases. 174 He argued
that, instead of allowing broad discovery under Hickman, the district courts
should employ a strict standard of relevance in reviewing discovery requests
in defamation cases.' 7' Since Justice Marshall's approach offers the press in-
creased protection From roving discovery, it is preferable to the approach of
the Herbert majority. However, even Justice Marshall's approach presents
some practical problems. First, the district courts would have to become in-
volved to a greater extent than they presently are in the discovery process.
Already the dockets of district courts are overburdened.' 76
 Increasing delay is
experienced in gaining access to the court system.' 77 Any time that district
court judges spend supervising the discovery process is time taken away from
hearing cases. Conversely, a privilege for the editorial process would not re-
quire the courts to get involved to as great a degree in discovery. After the
boundaries of the privilege were defined by the courts, the discovery process
would continue to operate in defamation cases without judicial supervision. A
second problem with Marshall's approach is that a directive to use a stricter
standard of relevance in measuring discovery requests would not help to re-
solve the lingering confusion over the question of what is relevant in proving
"actual malice." The question of relevance in determining "actual malice" has
become so clouded that judges frequently reach diametrically opposed view-
points on the same question. For example, on the issue of "actual malice" in
the Herbert case consider the variance of opinions of Justice White ("the rele-
vance of answers to such inquiries ... can hardly be doubted") 178 and Justice
Stewart ("inquiry into the broad 'editorial process' is simply not relevant"). 19
These statements reveal that there is considerable confusion even on the Su-
preme Court as to what is relevant in proving "actual malice." Consequently, a
directive to the courts to judge discovery requests by a stricter standard of
relevance would make the degree of protection afforded entirely too depen-
dent on the subjective judgment of the district court. Thus, the confusion
over the term "actual malice" weighs against Marshall's approach in curbing
discovery abuse.
'" See generally Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J.
387 (1935).
17"
 441 U.S. at 205.
' 74 Id. at 206.
175 Id.
17 ' See, e.g., Lasker, The Corr! Crunch: A View From The Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245
(1978).
177 Id. at 250.
'" 441 U.S. at 170.
179 Id. at 199.
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D. Actual Malice and the Editorial Process
In addition to undercutting jusice Marshall's argument, the confusion
over the term "actual malice" highlights an independent problem with the
majority decision in Herbert. The Court in Herbert found the questions ad-
dressd to Lando's motivation to be of undoubted relevance. However, once
the meaning of "actual malice" is ascertained, it becomes clear that questions
directed at the editorial process are aimed at showing common law malice and
are of only marginal relevance to the issue of "actual malice." Further, such
questions which reveal the defendant's personal feelings about the plaintiff
are highly prejudicial to the jury. If the jury hears testimony that the defen-
dant disliked the plaintiff and that the defendant's publication was false, the
jury may be unduly influenced in determining the issue of "actual malice."
Much of the confusion in this area stems from the Court's unfortunate
choice of such terms of art as "actual malice" and "reckless disregard for the
truth" to describe the requisite subjective knowledge of probable falsity. As
Justice Stewart noted in his dissent, judges have often been led astray by the
"actual malice ." standard of New York Times."" Many have confused "actual
malice" with common law malice which entails spite, hostility, or deliberate
intention to harm. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "ac-
tual malice" is not the same as common law malice,'" the question has not
been resolved as to what. the relationship is between the two. Some courts
have allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the publisher harbored
ill will towards the plaintiff provided that is not the only evidence of "actual
malice."'" Other courts have held that the publisher's feelings toward the
plaintiff are irrelevant.'"
While there apparently is a tenuous relationship between "actual malice"
and common law malice, the evidentiary value of admitting evidence of com-
mon law malice is outweighed by the prejudicial effect that such evidence
would have on the trier of fact. If a publisher dislikes an individual he may be
more likely to print a defamatory story about the person, knowing that it is
false, then if the publisher was neutral. Therefore, there is some evidentiary
value in allowing the inference to be drawn that because a publisher harbored
ill- will the publication was made with "actual malice." The question is—how
valid an inference is this? Is it fair to infer that because a publisher disliked
an individual and because a defamatory falsehood was published, that the
'" Id. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Byesler, 398 U.S. 6, 10
(1970) (reversing ittry award for plaintiff based on trial court judge's instruction that
actual malice means spite, hostility or intentional harm); Mobile Press Register Inc. v.
Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (Ala. 1979) (holding reversible error a jury instruc-
tion which charged actual malice could be shown by evidence of ill will, hostility.
rivalry I )1 . threats).
" 1 Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970).
" See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginsberg, 414 1-...2d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969); Airlie
Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Stipp. 421, 429 (1).D.C.
1972); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 254 Intl. 219, 250, 259 N.E.2d 651, 664,
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970).
s : ) See, e.g., Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting, 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976); Polzin
v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 588, 196 N.W.2(1 685, 691 (1972).
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publisher knew the story was false? To the contrary, it does not necessarily
follow that any critical commentary concerning a public official whom the
publisher disliked was made with knowledge of probable falsity. Yet to allow
in evidence of the publishers spite and hostility towards the plaintiff is likely
to be very prejudicial.
Once it is recognized that evidence of improper motivation is of only
marginal relevance in determining actual malice, it becomes clear that the
court in Herbert fell victim to the common error of confusing the two types of
malice. In the Herbert case most of the questions directed at Lando's judgment
process appear to be calculated to show that Lando was improperly motivated
in pursuing certain sources and in presenting certain viewpoints.'" Such
questions were only tangentially relevant to the real issue in the case—
whether Lando knew that the story was false—and a privilege preventing the
plaintiff from exploring this area, contrary to the court's opinion, would have
given up little of real evidentiary value.
IV. THE EFFECT OF AN EDITORIAL. PRIVILEGE
ON DEFAMATION ACTIONS
As previously indicated, the Herbert Court's failure to recognize an edito-
rial privilege may have a substantial effect on the press—discovery abuse will
remain unchecked, newsroom discussions will be discouraged, and the com-
mon law/actual malice distinction will remain confused. Of course, in evaluat-
ing the concept of an editorial privilege, the benefits of the privilege—a more
accurate, uninhibited press and a reduction in discovery abuse—must
be balanced against what would be lost by granting a privilege to the
editorial process. There would be some evidence, relevant to the case,
and helpful to the plaintiff's cause, which would be unavailable to the
plaintiff. Discussions between journalists may show knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. Thus, granting a privilege might result in
some cases where the plaintiff would not be able to develop sufficient evi-
dence by other sources to show "actual malice." In addition, assuming that the
privilege would apply at trial as well as in discovery,'" the plaintiff would lose
the opportunity to question the defendant directly on the issue of "actual
I"
 For an example of specific questions objected to by Lando, see Note, Herbert
v. Lando: State of Mind Discovery and the New York Times v. Sullivan Balance, 66 CAL. L.
REv. 1127, 1130 (1978), listing questions from defendant's memo of law in opposition
to plaintiffs Rule 37 application Appendix A, at 1.
Q. Were- you interested in showing a balanced viewpoint as to Col. Her-
bert's treatment of the Vietnamese?
Q. What was the basis on which you decided to conduct an interview with
Bruce Potter three times and to conduct no interviews with Laurence Pot-
ter?
Q. By failing to mention the Donovan statements in the broadcast did you
intend to influence the impression created by the program as to whether
Col. Herbert had reported any war crimes to Brigade headquarters while
he was still in the 173d Airborne Brigade?
Id. at 2. See also questions listed by Mr. justice Stewart, 441 U.S. at 201 n.2.
' 8 ' See note 90 supra.
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malice" unless the defendant waived the privilege. There is some question,
however, as to how much of a loss this would really be. It is doubtful that a
defendant would admit to any knowledge of falsity. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
would lose the opportunity of cross-examining the defendant on the issue and
having the jury observe the defendant's demeanor.
The privilege would not, however, as some courts and commentators
have claimed,'" completely eliminate a cause of action for a defamed public
official. There are a number of ways of establishing the required state of
mind through the use of circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff could show by
the cumulative effect of a number of factors that the defendant entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the story. For example, if the privilege was
fashioned after the executive privilege, it would protect only the "deliberative
or policymaking process" not "factual" material.'" The Herbert Court's asser-
tion in this regard, that the outer perimeters of the privilege would be dif-
ficult to discern,'"" is unfounded. Although the extent of the privilege would
have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis, it is clear that the executive
privilege as embodied in Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act,'"
and the cases decided thereunder, could serve as an effective framework.
Only predecisional communications between journalists would be protected.
Factual material such as conversations with people interviewed would not be
protected."" Therefore, the plaintiff could discover what facts the journalist
had in his possession."' The jury could infer "actual malice" from the de-
fendant's use and application of the facts in his possession and from the fail-
ure to heed contradictory information."' The plaintiff could also show that a
story was the complete fabrication of the journalist,'" or that the publisher
had been put on notice as to the story's probable falsity."' Further, the plain-
tiff could show that the story was inherently implausible or that the source of
the story was obviously unreliable.' 95
"" See Note, Herbert v. Lando: New Impediments to Libel Suits Brought by Public
Figures, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 583,598 (1978). See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F.
Supp. 1341, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (on reargument).
181 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (executive privilege protects policymak-
ing process, it dues not cover factual material).
' 8 " 441 U.S. at 170.
"" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
1 "" See, e.g., National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
516 F.2d 1229 (1).0;. Cir. 1975) (factual material not covered by Exemption #5); Mon-
trose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (interagency
memorandum consisting solely of factual material not exempt from disclosure);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. C:ir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970) (exemption #5 does not apply to purely factual reports).
"' See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977).
1`+2 Id .
See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 ('7th Cir. 1976) (ac-
tual malice found based on story being a complete Fabrication of journalist).
'm See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169-70 (1967) (War-
ren, Cd., concurring) (fact that plaintiff informed editors prior to publication of story's
inaccuracy was evidence of actual malice).
"'' In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Saturday Evening
Post published an article alleging that University of Georgia football coach Wally Butts
had "thrown" a game by disclosing the team's strategies, plays and formations to Uni-
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In addition to the alternative methods of proof available, it is probable
that in many cases the press would not claim the privilege. The privilege en-
visioned would be an evidentiary privilege which the defendant could waive.
In many instances it is the defendant in a libel action who first introduces
evidence of the editorial process in order to establish that it was a good faith
publication.'" In those cases, the privilege would be waived and the plaintiff
would have access to the editorial discussions. The fact that. the privilege
would often be waived in no way detracts from the importance of the
privilege to the press. One rationale underlying the privilege is to encourage
candid discussions among editors. If the privilege is later waived it will still
have accomplished its purpose of eliminating any "chilling effect" in the pre-
publication stage.
Finally, it must be re-emphasized that the editorial privilege sought in
Herbert would have applied only to defamation actions brought by public offi-
cials and public figures. As previously noted,'• the Court has restricted this
class of individuals to those who hold public office or who have sought to
influence the resolution of public issues. The Court noted in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc." that such people exercise enormous influence in our society and
to some extent have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood due to their position or influence."" Indeed, the
Court in New York Times maintained only a limited cause of action for the
defamed public plaintiff in order to promote an uninhibited debate of the
conduct of public individuals."' Thus, the editorial privilege would be consis-
tent with the balance struck between the competing interests of protecting the
individual's reputation and promoting an uninhibited debate of public issues
and the people influencing the resolution of those issues.
The privilege would advance the first amendment values articulated in
New York Times by promoting a robust and uninhibited press while still allow-
ing room for a defamation action in cases of journalistic excess. Additionally,
it would advance the first amendment interest of providing a more accurate
news media. The rationale for the privilege is analogous to the rationale sup-
porting the executive privilege: a decision making process which is open to
public review does not produce the most accurate news media. The burden
imposed on defamation plaintiffs by such a privilege would not be debilitat-
ing. The plaintiff would be able to establish "actual malice" by a number of
methods employing circumstantial evidence. There perhaps would be margin-
versify of Alabama coach Paul Bryant. The sole source for the story was a convicted
criminal who allegedly heard through an accidental foul-up. in the telephone lines
Butts' conversation with Coach Bryant. Id. at 135-36, 157. Despite the unreliability of
the source and the sheer improbability of the story, the Post failed to investigate the
convict's charges before publishing. The Court ruled that "reckless disregard" could be
inferred from those facts. Id. at 167-68. See also St. Arrant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
732 (1968) (listing ways to prove actual malice).
"" 441 U.S. at 173 n.21.
' 97 See text at note 45 supra.
1 " 8 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1 " Id. at 345.
211
 376 U.S. at 270.
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al cases where the plaintiff would not prevail because of the privilege, but this
would be a minimal price to pay in order to promote the first amendment
interest in a free and uninhibited press.
CONCLUSION
In Herbert, the Court was faced with the novel concept, arising out of the
New York Times case and its progeny, of providing a privilege to protect the
editorial decision making process and the thought processes of the journalist.
from intrusive discovery. The Court correctly determined that such a
privilege was not established by prior case law. In reviewing the rationale for
creating such a privilege, however, the Court. did not give full consideration to
the important first amendment interests involved. An editorial privilege would
have protected the editorial decision making process from being opened to
the public. This protection would have promoted the dual first amendment
goals of an uninhibited and a more accurate press. Further, the privilege
would have drastically reduced the opportunity for retaliatory discovery abuse
tactics by defamation plaintiffs. The cost. of providing the privilege to the
press would have been to increase the public official plaintiff's burden in
proving "actual malice." The plaintiff would, however, still have been able to
establish "actual malice" through the use of circumstantial evidence. In view
of these important first amendment goals which would be served at a minimal
increase in the &Lunation plaintiff's burden of proof, and in view of the
unpersuasive reasoning of the Herbert decision, the concept of an editorial
privilege warrants reexamination.
BARRY J. PALMER
